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ABSTRACT 
The present project draws on experience from the privatization and financing of 
the private participation program of electricity generating industry in Thailand. The 
impact of Asian financial crisis on the infrastructure development and reaction of the 
Thai Government are discussed. The project investigates the project financing arranged 
for Khanom Electricity Generating Company Limited (KEGCO) which illustrates that 
local financing is limited in developing countries, though the need for infrastructure is 
enormous. Development of local capital market and more innovative financing 
technique are necessary for infrastructure developments in developing countries, ln this 
project, the financing for KEGCO boosted the development of the Thai baht debt 
market. In addition, it demonstrates that EGAT is very wise to set up EGCO, REGCO 
and KEGCO because EGAT understands the risk involved in the privatization process. 
By establishing separate companies and arranging for outside equity investors, EGAT 
limits its risk exposure while sacrificing small percentage of potential returns. Finally, 
this project shows that EGAT has increased the tariff and restructured the financing in 
order to tackle the problem of debt burden after baht depreciation and electricity 
demand reduction. 
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Asia is the fastest growing and largest market for private sector participation in 
infrastructure. Since financing requirements for infrastructure development are huge, 
infrastructure has traditionally been the public sector in developing countries. Most of 
the Asian developing countries increase the investment in infrastructures in order to 
match the growth of economic developmentV These countries tend to privatize power 
projects, however, most of the projects are Independent Power Producers (IPP) 
projects. The reason why Asia countries want to privatize power plants is that the 
investment for the infrastructure is beyond the capacity of governments and those 
governments do not have sufficient resources in managing more utilities. It is widely 
believed that private sector participation improves efficiency by competition, however 
the privatization of power projects are driven by politics in Asia�. 
Privatization of power sector is major trend in both developing and developed 
countries. Full scale privatization has occurred in Latin America and privatization 
programs also have been implemented in the United Kingdom. In Asia, privatization 
has begun in recent years because the power sector is a public monopoly before. 
Electricity is a strategic and publicly provided good and people believe that they have a 
right to power at low prices. The privatization of electricity generation industry in 
1 Michael P. McLindon. Privatization and Capital Market Development: Strategies to Promote 
Economic Growth. Westport, Connecticut: Praeger. 
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Thailand has been one of the most successful privatization process in Asia. In the 
process Thailand faces different challenges, especially the Asian financial crisis. 
Commercialization and corporatization of state owned power utilities are first 
steps in the process of restructuring and attracting private sector participation, ln 
privatization, power companies must be treated like commercial enterprises which have 
to pay interest, taxes, commercially competitive rates of return on equity, and have the 
autonomy to manage their own budgets. Although privatization is complex, one of the 
benefits of privatization is efficiency which outweigh the loss of national strategic 
control that privatization brings to it. Private financiers are able to mobilize the funds 
necessary to finance infrastructure projects, and private sponsors willing to accept both 
project and country risks. 
Dependence on external funding presents risksl Increasingly, Thailand is 
looking to domestic financial markets to help fund massive infrastructure requirements. 
However, the domestic banking system is often unable to cope with the demand for 
long-term funds. Capital markets provide an opportunity for raising long term 
resources and channeling them to such projects, so project fmance always play a major 
role in financing privatization projects for state owned utilities^. Infrastructure projects 
incur high cost or large initial investment with steady future cash flows, project finance 
is highly suitable for that because the infrastructure project can service their loans and 
get desired return on equity by the future cash flows�, ln addition, risks are shared 
2 Thomas H. Pyle. The Life and Death of an Infrastructure Project 2nd Edition. Hong Kong: Asia Law 
& Practice Publishing Limited. 1997. 
3 Vaughan C. Jones. Financial Risk Analysis of Infrastructure Debt. New York: Quorum Books, 1991. 
4 Anjali Kumar, R. David Gray, Mangesh Hoskote, Stephan von Klaudy, and JeffRuster. Mobilizing 
Domestic Capital Markets for Infrastructure Financing： International Experience and Lessons for 
China. Washington D.C. : The World Bank. 1997. 
5 Sidney M. Levy. Build. Operate. Transfer: Paving the Way for Tomorrow's Infrastructure. New 
York: J. Wiley & Sons. 1996. 
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among different parties of the project and the project company can get greater leverage 
than a normal sponsor. 
Thesis 
The fast economic growth pressures the need for infrastructure development in 
developing countries. In the power sector, cheap and sufficient electricity is the 
common goal of government and end-users. Building more power plants and 
improving the efficiency of existing plants are necessary to cope with the increasing 
demand of electricity. However, huge initial investment and different types of risks are 
the major barriers for building new plants. Competition with private participation is 
one of the best method to improve the efficiency of state-owned electricity generating 
facilities but it is difficult to achieve. 
In the following discussion, the project shows how the privatization of the Thai 
power industry through the spin-off of EGAT has been one of the most successful 
privatization processes in Asia. Although Asian countries had faced financial crisis in 
1997 and many infrastructure projects have been canceled or postponed after the crisis, 
the project shows that support and relationship with government is very important for 
infrastructure projects in facing difficulties such as depreciation of local currency and 
reduction of future cash flow, ln addition, the structure of Power Purchase 
Agreements (PPA) and risk management are substantial factors for the success of 
infrastructure projects. This privatization process not only contributed to the power 
sector, but also it boosted the Thai baht bond market for the financing of other 
infrastructure development in Thailand. 
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Producing cheap and sufficient electricity supply is the initial objective of the 
restructuring of state-owned power plants^. Ridiculously, the result of the private 
participation is that the tariff becomes higher because the risks faced by the projects 
KEGCO, IPPs and SPPs was passed to the end-users after the financial crisis. 
However the pass-through arrangement and support by the government which 
increases the cost of electricity are the successful factor of the project's financing 
arrangement. 
Background 
Thailand requires infrastructure development to cope with the economic 
growth. A key question which confronts Thailand is how infrastructure developments 
can be financed. Local financial resources are limited and financing infrastructure by 
government is nearly impossible, ln the absence of budgetary financing, financing 
through banking system and capital markets is necessary. Thai commercial banks could 
finance infrastructure projects, however, shortage of local long-term loans limits the 
participation. Thus, capital markets become a major source of financing and it is 
feasible to fmance infrastructure projects through issuing equities and bonds. Since the 
Thai Government set a foreign debt ceiling which limits the borrowing for financing 
infrastructure projects, privatization plan is necessary to develop the infrastructures. 
6 Douglas Webb. Privatisation ofUtilities and Infrastructure: Methods and Constraint. Paris: 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. 1997. 
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Thailand Economy and State-Owned Enterprises (SOE) 
Thailand is located in the southeast Asia and about 80% of people work in 
agriculture. The economic growth rate was slow during the 1980s. Since 1990, the 
economy has grown rapidly in 8.9% per year. In the past, the government was the 
major force of the Thai economy because individuals were not able to invest in large 
industries and the local financial market cannot support the growth of the economy. 
In Thailand, every organization in which the Royal Thai Government holds at 
least 51% of share is defined as state owned enterprises. Public utilities and 
infrastructure are necessary for the country, therefore, the government established the 
SOEs as follows: 
• Petroleum Authority of Thailand (PTT); 
• Electricity Generation Authority ofThailand (EGAT); 
• Provincial Electricity Authority (PEA); 
• Metropolitan Electricity Authority (MEA); 
• Metropolitan Waterworks Authority (MWA); 
• Provincial Waterworks Authority (PWA); 
• Communications Authority of Thailand (CAT); 
• Telephone Organization ofThailand (TOT); 
• Airports Authority of Thailand (AAT); 
• Bangkok Mass Transit Authority (BMTA); 
• Express the Rapid Transit Authority (ERTA); 
• Express Transportation Organization (ETO); 
• Mass Communications Organization ofThailand (MCOT); 
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• Port Authority of Thailand (PAT); and 
• State Railway of Thailand (SRT). 
The other reason of establishing SOEs is that some industries contribute 
significant revenue to the government but it harms the society, so the government 
established Thai tobacco monopoly, playing card factory, liquor distillery organization 
and Government Lottery Bureau. In order to financing SOEs, the Thai government 
also established financial SOEs including Krung Thai Bank, Government Saving Bank, 
Government Housing Bank, Bank of Agriculture, Agricultural Cooperatives and Office 
of the Public Pawnshop. 
All SOE assets and revenue are about 56% and 17% of GDP respectively. 
Total number of employees in 1992 is 306,710 and more than US$37.6 billion long 
term debt has accumulated by these SOEs. 
Privatization Program of State-Owned Enterprises 
Ideally, governments would liberalize their electricity generation sectors 
because it establishes private and competitive power sector that produces cheap 
power. Unfortunately, governments do not always see this situation and most state-
owned power plants are losing money. Privatization improves the efficiency because 
private enterprises work for profit^. In addition, efficient risk allocation, access to 
foreign capital, improved investor perceptions, improved service quality, efficiency, 
competitiveness, stronger consumer support, broadened political support, deeper 
domestic capital markets, increase number of shareholder are benefits of privatizing 
state owned utilities. However, in management, the government is difficult to maintain 
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the control of the enterprise by inviting private sector with its expertise and know-how. 
In addition, conflicts between the government and the private sector may produce 
negative consequences. In order to support privatization, a well regulated securities 
market is also needed. Losing jobs, control by foreign companies, sovereignty and 
security problems are the side effects of privatization. 
The first round of privatization in Thailand is to list the public utilities such as 
EGAT, MEA, PEA, PTT, CAT and TOT on the stock market and the Ministry of 
Finance is responsible for the supervision of the privatization. Thai government uses 
different methods in the privatization program. SOEs issue shares in order to reduce 
loans and debts, however, the government usually holds the largest amount of shares. 
In some SOEs, they are denationalized by deregulation, divestiture, commercialization, 
corporatization, or privatization. At last, the government allow private companies 
compete with SOEs in order to create competition for raising productivity. 
In Thailand, the plans for private involvement in the power sector is the 
privatization of existing state assets^. Therefore, EGAT would undergo 
commercialization and restructuring. The following chapters present the case that 
KEGCO acquired the Khanom which is a 824-megawatt power plant from the EGAT 
for US$800 million. The deal also included project financing, international equity 
offering，bank loan and a 15-year bond denominated in Thai baht which was the second 
major privatization of a power plant in Thailand. 
7 "Power Generation to Fuel Southeast Asia's Gas Surge." Oil and Gas Joumal (July 1995) 




THE PRIVATE PARTICIPATION PROGRAM OF THAI ELECTRICITY 
GENERATING FNDUSTRY 
Thailand needs more electricity because electricity production sustains 
economic development. In international standard, the consumption of electricity in 
Thailand is relatively low. The industrial sector shares around 46% of electricity 
demand, followed by commercial 28%, residential 21% and others 5%. Since the 
capacity has not kept pace in recent years, in order to remedy this situation, increasing 
the electricity generation and importing electricity is a must. 
Since the electricity demand increases rapidly and the investment in power 
sector would increase the foreign debt of Thai Government, the Thai Government 
endorsed a four-step privatization plan to restructure the electricity generating system 
in order to privatize the electricity industry by private sector investments in 1992. ln 
this plan, the Thai government encourages the private investments in electricity 
industry, however, independent private sector is not allowed in transmission or 
distribution, and private power producers require to sell electricity to EGAT. 
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The Four-Step Plan ofRestructuring the Thai Electricity Power Sector 
Step 1 
• Give EGAT greater autonomy 
• Establish EGCO to undertake privatization projects 
Step 2 
• Sell Rayong and Khanom from EGAT to EGCO 
• Start private sector investments 
Step3 
• Convert EGAT from an SOE to a limited company 
• Launch IPP projects 
Step4 
• Restructure MEA and PEA to business entities 
• Increase capital ofEGAT by public offering 
In 1992, Thailand have planned to privatize electricity generation so that 
Electricity Generating Public Company Limited (EGCO) was incorporated. Initially, 
EGCO was established as wholly owned subsidiary of Electricity Generating Authority 
ofThailand (EGAT). After EGCO purchased Rayong Power Station (Rayong), EGCO 
was listed on the Stock Exchange of Thailand and EGAT's interest in EGCO was 
reduced to just under 50%. Rayong was purchased by Rayong Electricity Generating 
Company Limited (REGCO) which is a wholly-owned subsidiary of EGCO. In the 
similar practice, Khanom Electricity Generating Company Limited (KEGCO) was 
incorporated as a wholly-owned subsidiary company of EGCO to purchase and 
operate Khanom. In May 1995，National Energy Policy Office (NEPO) has agreed to 
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sell the Khanom power plant in southern Nakhon Si Thammarat province. This move is 
one of the privatization of the country's electricity generating industry. 
In a similar process, three new subsidiaries are to be formed to hold the 
remainder of EGAT's thermal stations, and then sold off. EGAT will retain control of 
the transmission grid and of its hydro plant, the new generating groups are scheduled 
to begin listing in the third quarter of 1997, however, the timing may slip by the 
current depressed state of the market. The four privatized generating companies will 
exist as commercial entities, competing with each other and the various Independent 
Power Producers (IPP). 
Electricity Generating Authority ofThailand (EGAT) 
EGAT is a government authority which is supported by the Government of 
Thailand and it controls the electricity generation and transmission. The role of EGAT 
includes pricing, expanding, promoting electricity industry and establishing the 
privatization of Thailand's electricity generation. 
The Thai Cabinet approved privatization of EGAT on 12 September 1992. The 
objective of the privatization in electricity generation is to encourage private 
participation in the electricity sector. In this plan, EGAT still remains the monopoly of 
electricity transmission and the Thai Government still remain interest in EGAT. 
Thailand's power sector has always been dominated by the EGAT and it has generated 
efficient power supply by controlling power plants, transmission system and the 
construction programs. EGAT received the Operations Management Award from the 
World Executive Digest's Second Annual Asia Management Awards Program which 
recognize EGAT's raising production capacity substantially while maintaining high 
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quality power service. Until 1994, the capacity of EGAT is 12989MW by its 136 
generating stations. 
Electricity Generating Public Company Limited (EGCO) 
EGCO was incorporated as EGAT's wholly owned subsidiary on 12 May 1992 
and it was established to structure the electricity generation business into separate 
operating subsidiaries to obtain financing on a project basis. It becomes a major private 
sector player in electricity generation by developing and acquiring electricity 
generating assets. To comply with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and 
Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET) listing requirements, EGCO registered as a public 
limited company on 23 March 1994 and increased its registered capital to THB 4000 
million. 
Ravong Electricity Generating Company Limited (REGCO) 
Financing for Rayong Electricity Generating Company is a benchmark for the 
private participation program of the Thai electricity generating industry. To acquire 
Rayong, EGCO established a wholly-owned special-purpose company REGCO to 
purchase the Rayong power plant in June 1994 by raised debt and equity capital. The 
financing structure was complex which included an IPO THB 6.448million. An amount 
THB 4.799 million from IPO was used for acquiring Rayong, moreover, a THB 14 
billion debt financing including a US$ 141 million 10 year international syndicated 
loan; US$ 141 million 15 year US private placement; THB 3.550 million 12 year Thai 
on-shore syndicated loan; THB 6.5 million 12 year Thai on-shore revolving working 
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capital bank line; THB 3500 million two tranche Thai debentures was followed. The 
strong power purchase agreement and the high creditability of EGAT made the private 
placement success and the project company can receive a 20% to 25% rate of return 
under the take-or-pay agreement. 
Khanom Electricity Generating Company Limited (KEGCO) 
Khanom serves the southern Thailand in Region 3 of EGAT's transmission 
system and the excess power supply can be transmitted to the main power grid of 
EGAT. Consistent with EGCO's philosophy, KEGCO was incorporated as a wholly-
owned special-purpose subsidiary with THB 100 million capital on 20 February 1995. 
The acquisition of KEGCO to EGCO is one of the steps in the privatization process in 
the power sector. 
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CHAPTER III 
PRIVATIZATION PROJECT OF KHANOM 
The privatization project of Khanom has the strong support from the Thai 
Government. The project is very important to Thailand because it is one of the major 
t 
step of the four-step privatization plan of the electricity generating industry. In the 
project, EGAT is the offtaker and a major maintenance contractor. EGAT has good 
credit rating because it has good relationship with the Government and EGAT remains 
the monopoly of electricity transmission. 
Power Purchase Agreement (PPA� 
A long-term Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) was signed with EGAT. The 
power price can be broken down into two parts: Availability Payments (AP) which 
covers all fixed expenses and Energy Payments (EP) which covers the incremental 
costs of energy production. The PPA stated that the power tariff passes through fixed 
costs, fuel costs and variable costs to EGAT by an Availability Payment and Energy 
Payment. The electricity tariff can generate revenues which can cover all costs. The 
Availability Payment includes debt service charges which consists interest rate cushions 
for US Dollar and Japanese Yen denominated financing to allow for potential 
additional debt servicing costs due to Thai Baht depreciation. 
14 
Availability Payments from EGAT to KEGCO is required. Inflation risks, fuel 
cost, operation and maintenance, general administration costs are pass through to 
EGAT. In addition, all completion risk are absorbed by EGAT and a strong sensitivity 
analysis including impacts from inflation, interest rate, foreign exchange rate, plant 
availability level and other plant operating characteristics, heat rate and dispatch level 
provides a cushion for lenders. Therefore, the PPA was well structured. 
The principal revenue is from the sale of electricity to EGAT. The base case 
revenue is derived as follows: 
Base Case Revenue = Availability Payment (AP) + Energy Payment (EP) 
where 
AP = Full Availability Payment (FAP) - Deduction for Reduced Availability (DRA) 
due to active power 
FAP = Base Availability Credit (BAC) * Dependable Contracted Capacity (DCC) * 
number of hours in a year 
DRA due to active power = BAC * DCC * (number of hours in a year - Contracted 
Availability Hours (CAH)) 
EP = Actual Fuel Cost (AFC) + Actual Variable and Operation Maintenance (VOM) 
costs 
Thus, Base Case Revenue (BCR) can be simplified mathematically as BCR = 
BAC * DCC * CAH + AFC + VOM and it shows that base case revenue depends on 
five factors: BAC, DCC, CAH, AFC and VOM. 
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All projections are made in Thai baht. A 20 or 25 year pricing structure to an 
electric utility would be proposed. Pricing structure of an electricity generating plant 
are based on a rate of return which allows the project get the most competitive pricing 
structure. It involves a capacity payment, a fixed operations and maintenance payment, 
a variable operations and maintenance payment and an energy payment. 
The capacity payment provides all debt service and payments to investors for 
return on equity. It would usually increase from start and until optimized capacity 
utilization, then it would be fixed over the life of the project. In addition, it could be 
escalated to match the amortization of the debt. For the fixed operations and 
maintenance payment, variable operations and maintenance component would increase 
at inflation over the project life. The energy payment would cover fijel cost and it is 
changed according to the fuel price. Since no profits is earned from the fixed operation 
and maintenance, variable operations and maintenance, and energy payments, they are 
defined as ‘pass through' payments. 
In the PPA, income tax rate of 30%, THBAJSD exchange rate be constant at 
THB 25.2AJSD and CPI increase at 4.25% are assumed. The assumptions are 
reasonable before the financial crisis. However, after the financial crisis, baht has 
depreciated by about 40% and the CPI would be lower than 4.25%. Initial debt-to-
equity ratio was assumed 3 to 1 and post-debt service cash flow generating IRR of 
19% was assumed. In addition, interest expense and USD debt repayments would be 
converted to THB at the future exchange rates. 
In the base case, the minimum debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) is 1.34 and 
an average ofDSCR is 1.53. In the worst estimated case, the minimum DSCR would 
be reached by either CPI increases to 9.85%, MUV increases to 8.2%, interest rate 
increases to 7.25%, THB devaluate 81% in 1996 and the availability drop to 78%. To 
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eliminate the foreign exchange risk, KEGCO would swap its Yen exposure from 
Euroyen bond into USD and then reduce the exchange exposure by hedging. KEGCO 
has effectively allocated many of the risks to those parties that are best able to manage 
them. Most of the interest rate risk is hedged in he financial markets, and reserve 
accounts are available to provide a further cushion to lenders for any retained or 
unhedged risks. The project's economics benefit from the PPA structure in that many 
cost increases beyond KEGCO's control are pass-through items in the power tariff. 
Financing Plan 
In power project financing, there have to seek as many ftind sources as 
possible. Typically, the financing includes local bank debt, foreign export credits, 
multilateral agency credit, co-financing facilities, private placements and commercial 
bank debt. The break-up and privatization of SOEs in electricity generation and the 
privatization of stand alone generation facilities allow substantial project financing 
opportunities. Although large and prestigious local projects can usually attract local 
financing, however, local currency lenders are lack of funding and accept shorter 
terms. Due to high local interest rates, local currency loans in Asia are generally more 
expensive than foreign currency loans. International Finance Corporation (IFC) and 
Asian Development Bank (ADB) can provide loans and project guarantees with longer 
periods and repayment periods longer than commercial sources. Such facilities can 
provide for longer maturities of projects. Co-financing facilities, in conjunction with 
multilateral agencies provides direct lending. Multilateral agencies can subparticipate 
exposure to commercial banks by technically acting as lenders of record. Under this 
protection, commercial banks can enjoy the benefits accorded the multilateral agencies. 
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Commercial bank debt, generally provided to projects by large international banks 
acting through syndicates. 
Equity Financing 
In order to raising extra equity for EGCO, adding equity into KEGCO and 
borrowing debt on a non-recourse, project financing basis is used. In the acquisition, 
the project requires approximately THB 20.2 billion including THB 17483 million for 
the purchase of Khanom, THB 480 million for transaction and. development costs, 
THB 55 million for transfer fees and taxes, THB 1136 million for value added tax 
(VAT), and THB 972 million to fund a debt service reserve account. 
An offering of 40 million shares to existing shareholders who had a right to 
convert ten existing shares to one new share for raising approximately THB 6 billion 
followed by a public equity offering. Shares were priced at THB 30 and raised THB 
1200 million under this offering. In addition, another 80 million shares was offered to 
the general public. Thai investors and international investors was offered 56 million 
shares and 24 million shares respectively. Ten million shares remained for warrant 
conversion and these warrants were given to EGCO directors and employees as part of 
an employee stock-option. 
EGCO issued 19% of total shares to existing shareholders, 38% to general 
public，27% to Thai investors, 11% to international investors and the remaining shares 
were for warrant conversion as part of an employee stock-option. EGCO agreed to 
raise its authorized share capital from THB 4000 million to THB 5300 million by 
issuing 130 million ordinary shares at THB 10 par value each. 
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Debt Financing 
In the financing plan, KEGCO would borrow THB 15 million on a non-
recourse, project finance basis which would consist of three tranches. The first tranche 
is a syndicated loan to be repaid on a floating rate basis priced over US dollar LIBOR. 
The second tranche is a loan for six months provided by Thai commercial banks. The 
third tranche is a working capital facility provided by Thai banks. The floating rate risk 
ofthe first tranche is swapped into fixed rate. Then, KEGCO's remaining floating rate 
risk would be controlled to the third tranche approximately 1.5% of debt after fully 
paid the second tranche. 
A fixed rate secured Thai baht debenture was issued and the interest and 
principal repayments would be mortgage style. A ten year fixed rate Euroyen Bond 
was issued. Then, KEGCO swap the Yen from the Euroyen Bond into USD and 
additional foreign exchange hedging to mitigate USD risk. The loans debentures, and 
bonds will be secured on a pari passu basis which is senior to any other liabilities. 
The Deal ofKhanom 
Bangkok Bank and JP Morgan as financial advisors of the THB 20 billion 
acquisition package for KEGCO. In the deal, it included 25% equity injection from 
EGCO and a US$265 million 12-year offshore syndicated loan arranged by Bangkok 
branches of Bank of Tokyo, IBJ, Sanwa Bank and Sumitomo Bank, Sakura Finance 
Asia and Thai Farmers Bank. The third and most significant portion of the financing 
was a 7.5 billion baht 15 year fixed rate debenture issue arranged by Bangkok Bank, 
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Finance One and Union Asia Finance. The debenture was the longest and largest Thai 
baht debt issue ever. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE IMPACT OF ASIAN FWANCIAL CRISIS ON THE • R A S T R U C T U R E 
PROJECTS nM THAILAND 
The Financial Crisis in Thailand 
The Thai economy in 1997 was unable to receive the fiill benefit from an 
expansion in the world economy and trade. The major reasons for the crisis were huge 
deficits of current account, large amount of external debt, collapse of property, poor 
management of currency and the failure to rectify them in time^. 
Since the deficit of current account was high and the export growth decreased 
dramatically in 1995 and 1996, it caused Thailand to borrowing excessive external 
borrowing. The external debt was about US$99 billion, which US$71.7 incurred 
privately, was about 55% of GDP. ln addition, the property market boomed in the 
1980s, however, the housing was oversupply by 1995. In 1996, the debts was around 
800 billion baht and it began to collapse. After the property developers had cashflow 
problems or defaulted, many financial institutions, especially the small banks faced 
liquidity problems^". 
During 1993 and 1996，foreign money poured in Thailand for high interest 
rates which makes the baht was overvalued. Thailand was very vulnerable to foreign 
9 "Emerging Bubbles." Forbes (August 1997) 
1�"Why Did Asia Crash." The Economists (Januaty 1998) 
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capital because 99% of its foreign currency deposit liabilities was owed to foreigners. 
The Thai economy's decade long high growth rate has created high pressure on prices 
and the external balances, rapidly increasing the dependence on overseas short term 
funds. Despite the lack of necessary financial infrastructure and business skills in 
financial management under the free and open market system, it has resulted in 
excessive borrowing of funds from abroad. The excessive and unproductive use of 
foreign funds by private enterprises has resulted inserious macroeconomic imbalances. 
In addition, Government and corporations struggling to modernize and extend the 
country's overburdened infrastructure realize that they can save time and money and 
lower foreign-currency risk by tapping the local debt markets. 
At this time, the central bank was continuing peg with foreign currencies which 
US dollar influenced about 80%. In February 1997, the speculators began to attack 
baht. Then the Thai authority defended the baht with foreign reserves but it was 
unsuccessful. The baht needed to change from pegging to managed float after the 
devaluation.(Appendix 6) This financial crisis worsen the economy to grow by 0.6% in 
1997 compared with 6.4% in 1996. It not only makes the company to be closed, the 
unemployment would increase to 2 million. 
The private investment dropped significantly from 100.1 of private investment 
index in the first half of 1996 to 83.5 in the same period of 1997. Imports, 
manufacturing and food production also reduced after this crisis. On the other hand, 
exports would increase by the serious depreciation of baht which act as an engine for 
the growth of the economy. 
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Thai Government Reaction 
The World Bank advised on restructuring the financial sector of Thailand to 
remedy the situation after financial crisis. It has already committed $1.6 billion in 
structural adjustment loans to Thailand as part of the $17.2 billion bailout package 
arranged by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The funds will be used for 
restructuring the financial sector and an additional $300 million loan for the Social 
Investment Program to help generate jobs. In the 1997-1998 fiscal year, the Thai 
government decided to run a 800 billion baht budget surplus of 1% of GDP in order to 
fulfill the requirement set by the IMF in return of the US$17.2 billion bailout. The 
government was forced to cut more spending and to increase tax, though it would 
deteriorate the economy further. Thailand is complying well with fiscal measures, 
monetary policies and exchange rate measures which IMF demanded that as part of a 
US$17.2 billion rescue package'i. Moreover, Thailand were humble to face the 
problem rather than pointing fingers at others. 
Thailand also need to develop efficient capital markets for fostering 
institutional investment through pension reform and expansion of insurance and 
allowing greater access to foreign financial service providers. To mobilize long-term 
funds to support the financing of infrastructure-where investments needs are necessary. 
Pension system are in need of reform, especially in the management of investment 
funds. Thailand must concentrate on tackling the long-term structural issues whether 
they relate to the financial system, to the issues of the infrastructure, to the issues of 
the education system or longer term competitiveness. The Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) emphasized that ensuring the independence of regulatory bodies 
1�K.I. Woo "IMF Uncertainty Clouds Financing ofMega-Projects." The Nation (August 4’ 97) 
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plays a critical role in developing capital markets and rebuilding investor confidence in 
the economy. 
The Electricity Industry 
The financial crisis deeply affected the growing demand for electricity in 
Thailand and it forced the whole industry to change. The electricity demand was 
1.98% below the base demand projected by energy planners and the growth rate 
dropped 1.02%. In the previous year, the growth rate of electricity demand is 8.99%. 
Higher fuel costs caused higher electricity tariffs. The tariff increased 7.88% in just 
four months. One of the assumption for the development of EGAT is that electricity 
consumption increases by the fast economic growth. The forecast has been more than 
the demand since 1996, however it causes revenue loss after financial crisis. Therefore, 
electricity investment becomes speculative though it was considered very safe. In 
addition, the central planning to predict demand and to set rates is not appropriate. 
Despite the poor economy, international investors like Electricite de France (EDF), the 
Wing Group, and Enron were confident investing in Thailand. Thai authorities believes 
the demand would increase, they signed an electricity purchase agreement with Yunnan 
province of China, and two memorandums of purchasing electricity from Laos and 
Myanmar. 
Since EGAT has an available supply of 5700 MW from IPP program and 3200 
MW from SPP program, so further investment in electricity supply is not necessary. 
The World Bank warned Thailand to avoid building large power plants because it 
requires large investment and the market would be dominated by large electricity 
providers. Apart from privatization, EGAT invested in new plants so the debt also 
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increased significantly. After the financial crisis, EGAT has slowed down constructing 
new plants but it has to pay its debt. EGAT intends to raise the rate to compensate the 
cost of investments. In April 1997, EGAT forecasted the demand would increase more 
than triple in 2011 because they expect the average economic growth is 7.8% per year. 
After the economic slump, EGAT would faces excess capacity of electricity because 
consumers cut electricity costs. Therefore, the purchases of electricity from SPPs and 
IPPs would be cut and the development plan ofEGAT would be slowed down. 
Power developers had agreed to shoulder the currency risk in a project is few 
in Thailand. On September 10, EGAT let the development consortia of the power 
projects know the terms to share some currency risk. A power project with no 
currency risk would have 20 to 30 percent equity funding and the rest in debt but it 
required to take currency risk may need at least 50 percent equity funding. However, 
more equity funding would increase the cost of the local electricity generated. 
Obviously, a project with a high equity content would need a higher electricity tariff to 
make it easier in financing. The high degree of leverage of Thai companies could cause 
problems for some of the seven Thai power projects especially those with local Thai 
sponsors. 
Electricity Generating Authority ofThailand (EGAT) 
The slowdown of demand forced EGAT to review its power supply plan after 
the slump of economy. The EGAT reduced its forecasting of electricity demand for the 
next ten years. The PEA also reduced the investment by 6 billion baht to 59 billion baht 
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in the next five years. Before the crisis, EGAT had expected to have 17.44 billion baht 
profit. By the huge depreciation ofbaht, EGAT had lost 30.25 billion baht in 1997^^ 
The huge foreign exchange loss was due to 23.79 billion baht offshore loan 
repayments, interest charges and the 6.45 billion baht work in process paid in foreign 
currencies because EGAT's project financing was from abroad. In order to get the 
minimum rate of return on investment of 8%, EGAT will spread the foreign exchange 
loss over the years following 1997. 
After the financial crisis, EGAT delayed the two thermal units of Ratchaburi 
power complex by three years to 2004 and 2005 respectively. Also EGAT postponed 
the Krabi power plant by four years until 2005. In addition, it will purchase fewer from 
SPPs from 3200 MW to 2000 MW during 1997 to 2003 and will reduce buying from 
IPPs from 4000 MW to 2300 MW. Also, it will delay the purchases from 992.5 MW 
to 608 MW produced from Laos. However, the hydropower projects in Laos was not 
affected by changing plan. The total reduction in investment can reduce 55 to 60 
million baht by 2001. 
The EGAT needs to dilute its 40.7% stake in EGCO to 20 percent to allow 
EGCO to participate in the second round of power purchase bidding under the IPP 
program, according to the NEPO where EGCO is listed in SET and holds 99.9 percent 
in KEGCO and REGCO. The EGAT's excess holding is estimated to be worth 1.09bn 
baht (US$43m) on a par price basis. EGCO made a net profit of 1.55 billion baht last 
year. 
The EGAT changed power purchase contracts to allow EGCO, IPPs and SPPs 
to adjust tariffs in line with the baht's fluctuation against foreign currencies. EGAT 
agreed to allow EGCO to raise the capacity charge, one of the tariff-pricing factors, 
12 "EGCO Reports Huge Forex Losses." Business Day Thailand (Febmaty 26, 98) 
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for the portion of expenditure involving foreign exchange. The contract with Rayong 
has 18 years to run, and those with Khanom will last 15, 20 and 20 years. EGAT's 
finalisation of forex indexation into the power tariffs of the two subsidiaries has led to 
positive views about the company, which would allow the two subsidiaries' equity 
Internal Rate ofReturn (IRR) to recover to the pre-float levels of 19.6 and 18 per cent 
respectively. The added protection, while serving as a cushion from the baht's fallout, 
will boost long-term earnings and cash flows, pushing up EGCO's NAV as well. Its 
other strengths are low customer default risk, with EGAT being the sole buyer, and 
insulation from foreign exchange risk by indexation of power tariffs that will enable 
earnings growth irrespective of whether electricity is dispatched or new projects can be 
found. 
EGCO lost 5.46 billion baht ($121 million) in 1997, against a profit of 1.55 
billion baht in the previous year because EGCO's debt is dollar-denominated. EGCO 
would postpone most new projects in short-term because of the weak baht and slowing 
economy. EGAT has amended its power purchase contracts with the EGCO in such a 
way to allow EGCO to adjust the power tariffs in line with the foreign exchange 
fluctuations. Specifically, the state power utility agreed to allow EGCO to raise the 
capacity charge, one of the tariff pricing factors, for the portion of expenditure 
involving foreign exchange such as overseas debt or imported equipment. The EGAT 
plans to call for another round of bidding in mid-1997 under Stage II of Thailand's 
independent power producers (IPP) program, for an additional 4000 MW of electricity 
to be supplied after 2002. EGAT negotiates with a shortlist oflPPs for the purchase of 
1300 MW of electricity under Stage I in Phase 1 of the IPP program, and for another 
2800 MW under Stage I in Phase II. 
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Small Power Producers (SPP) 
EGAT allowed SPPs to delay the start-up of power supply to EGAT from 
three months to two years. The delay was due to the financial problems of SPPs since 
it is extremely difficult to get local fund, sponsors of SPPs are acquiring fiinds from 
foreign investors by selling its stake. For example, Unocal Corporation participated in 
a US$160 million co-generation project with Thai Petrochemical Industry which had 
faced financial problems. TPI invited Unocal to hold half of all shares because TP1 was 
unable to construct the plant alone since May 1997. Alpha Power Limited was also 
seeking foreign partners. After spent 4 billion baht on the gas fired power project, 
Alpha needed 3 billion baht more to complete the project. EGAT allowed Alpha Power 
to postpone the sale of electricity. At last, Alpha wanted the German bank partner to 
take the stake and it was willing to undergo restructuring under the bank's guideline. 
After the crisis, there was only one SPP proceed with the scheme. Prachin Power 
Company had proposed to sell electricity to EGAT in October 1997. The delay of 
electricity supply from SPPs would not cause shortage of supply because the demand 
has been reduced by the economic downturn. 
Independent Power Producers (IPP) 
The plan of electricity development in Thailand was affected seriously after the 
financial crisis in 1997. The privatization of EGAT which was originally scheduled in 
early 1998 delayed by the crisis. Although the first IPP round contracts were awarded, 
the second IPP round would be probably delayed from late 1997 to early 1998. IPPs 
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moved ahead with the finalization contracts and EGAT continued to sign contracts 
with IPP contractors. EGAT allowed IPPs to adjust tariffby the fluctuation ofbaht, so 
IPPs can borrow further loans. Before the crisis, the tariff cannot be changed due to 
the exchange rate. The tariff was agreed based on 26 baht to a dollar and the payment 
was made in baht without any changes. At the same time, EGAT allowed Independent 
Power (Thailand), a consortium of Thaioil, Unocal and Westinghouse was allowed to 
delay the start by one month. Similarly, Tri Energy Company would delay one month 
beyond May 2000^1 
Other Electricity Projects 
After the financial crisis, different foreign investors in infrastructures use 
different approach to face the change'^. Since the revenue of ABB dropped 30% to 
US$200 million by the depreciation of baht, a crisis management program launched to 
improve efficiency by cost saving and productivity improvement. An US entrepreneur, 
the Wing Group, has strong confidence investing in Thailand because they believed 
that southeast Asia is the best place to invest for the future 20 to 30 years. In addition, 
Electricite de France, a French state owned utility continues to investment in Asia 
because they believe the crisis was a short term problem. In addition, Enron signed a 
partnership with a local Thai engineering firm EMC to invest power generation 
ventures in Thailand. 
13 "Thai IPP Bidding Broadened." Privatisation International (July 1，97) 
14 "When Growth Switches Off.” The Economists O^ovember, 1997) 
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Other Infrastructure Project: Hopewell BERTS 
About 250 private participated infrastructure projects in Asia which have 
planned before the crisis, almost halfhave been canceled or postponed. Since there are 
few Asian infrastructure projects are profitable enough to attract private sector 
participation, more government commitment is needed to reduce risks that the private 
sector has to bear in many cases". 
In 1990, Gordon Wu, chairman of Hopewell, was terribly bored by the traffic 
on his way from Don Muang Airport to downtown Bangkok. The trip was longer than 
the flight from Hong Kong. Suddenly he had an idea to develop an effective mass 
transportation system to help Bangkok in the traffic issue. 
Then, the Thai Cabinet approved Hopewell's Bangkok Elevated Rail and 
Transit System (BERTS) project without an engineering feasibility study, a cost-
benefit analysis and an environmental impact assessment, all the important essentials 
which is required normally. The project was approved in two months for the 
Communication Ministry to look into all the details. In the application, Hopewell had a 
clever approach in negotiations with the government over land acquisition and design 
approval which involves political motivation^^. 
Although the Thai government supports the project initially, it was not feasible 
to complete the project because Hopewell faced shortage of funds, ln the past seven 
years, Hong Kong-listed Hopewell Holdings made a HK$5 billion (US$650 million) 
provision against bad debts from the Bangkok scheme, which is being developed by a 
Thai subsidiary. The provision put the parent company in the red, reporting losses of 
15 "Government Considers Keeping Hopewell Project Alive." Business Day Thailand (December 4, 
97) • 
16 James Mclean. "Secrets of Mega-Pproject Success in Bangkok." Reuters News Service (October 30， 
97) 
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HK$1.7 billion (US$221 million). Hopewell also said it was withholding 600 million 
baht (US$14 million) of payments to the State Railway of Thailand (SRT) because 
promised land had not been handed over, meanwhile the SRT was threatening to sue 
Hopewell for 64 billion baht (US$1.5 billion) because of delays in the project, the 
majority of which was supposed to be completed in time for the Asian Games in 
Bangkok. Hopewell has completed less than 20 percent of the 60 km structure since 
the 1991 contract was signed, work has stopped and the deadline is unlikely to be met 
when contractors went unpaid but Gordon Wu consistently blamed on the authorities. 
Hopewell raised project equity to 15 billion baht ($517 million) from 6 billion baht 
during the first halfof 1997, but the government asked it to double that figure by 1998. 
In May 1997，the government also said that if the project was not complete by 
November 1998, it would fine Hopewell 7.5 million baht for each day of delay on 
Phase 1，for a maximum o f l 3 4 days. 
Property slump after the financial crisis had a negative impact on the revenue 
plan o fBERTSi : Hopewell planed to gain its most of the revenue from the land rights 
by the State Railway of Thailand and the service fare was considered as its support 
income. Devaluation of the baht has raised the cost of foreign loan principal 
repayments and annual interest costs on US dollar loansi^. Financial crises have 
increased the cost of BERTS, estimated at $3.2 billion to over four billion dollars. 
These factors have lead to creditor banks to extend additional loans for the project. 
BERTS will not be able to conclude financing arrangements without some form of 
guarantees, equity contributions, soft dollar loans, or even funding of revenue 
shortfalls from the government. During the rehabilitation process, government officials 
” "Currency Float Adds To Hopewell's Woes." Business Day Thailand (July 21，97) 
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will have to choose which projects are to be funded from the limited supply of funds. 
At this time, Gordon Wu asked the government for a 15 percent increase in previously 
agreed fares immediately and it is a difficult request because BERTS is a much larger 
and more complicated project though it arranged 30 billion baht ($1.2 billion) for the 
purchase ofrolling stock from a European consortium in August 96^ .^ 
Hopewell believes the weak Thai economy and baht devaluation has made its 
project uncertain and will not proceed with new investment in the project until all the 
fundamentals are satisfactory^^ Hopewell (Thailand) suspended work on the project in 
July 97 due to problems in seeking loans to fund \t^\ This delay prompted the 
government to decide to scrap the contract. The Thai Government has told Hopewell 
Holdings it is not prepared to go to arbitration over its decision to scrap the US$4 
billion project. The Thai authorities are also demanding Hopewell hand over a 500 
million baht (about HK$89.6 million) performance-based bond within 15 days^^. 
Hopewell was determined to seek compensation because it has already spent US$600 
million on the project, which is only about 20 per cent completecP. 
On 8 October 97, Thai Transport Minister Suwat Liptapalop has sent Hopewell 
a letter ending the Hopewell group's 30-year mass transit franchise in Bangkok^^. The 
$3.2 billion project originally due to be completed by 1999 is unable to complete the 
18 Ron Corben. "Thai Government Scrambling To Save Hopewell Holdings' 37 Billion Railway 
Project And Rapid Transit Network." Journal of Commerce (July 28, 97) 
19 Amornrat Mahilhirook. "Pradil Wants Airport Cash Diverted To Hopewell." Bangkok Post 
(December 19, 97) 
20 "Hopewell Decides To Put Its Road-Rail Project On Hold." Bangkok Post (October 30, 97) 
21 "Hopewell Woes." Infrastructure Finance (September 1, 97) 
22 William Barnes. "One Mass-Transit Vision Has Ended In Thailand, But It Needs Another End Of 
That Road For Wu." East Asia (October 1，97) 
23 Stewart Oldfield. "Hopewell Loses Bid For Bangkok Road And Rail Project Arbitration." South 
China Morning Post (March 2，98) 
24 William Barnes and Andrew Chetham. "Hopewell Faces Action Over Thai Rail Fiasco." South 
China Morning Post (November 21, 97) 
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work as planned25. Although bankers are ready to fund the project, it will not proceed 
until the government promises a fare raise. Government blamed the delay due to 
Hopewell's problems in raising equity and construction financing^^. BERTS has been 
dogged with controversy from the start, with disputes over shoulder width, the 
dimensions and depth of piles, and conflicts at intersections without infrastructure 
projects27. 
At the beginning, the first stage of the project was originally scheduled to be 
completed by the start of the Asian Games. At the end, Hopewell loses its project and 
Thailand keeps its traffic congestion. 
After the currency and financial crisis, Hopewell is not the only infrastructure 
casualty claimed. The mass transit scheme of Canada's SNC-Lavalin and the Bangkok 
toll road project of Japan's Kumagai Gumi fell victim to political interference earlier in 
the 1990s. Despite there is no recourse to Hopewell Holdings in Hong Kong, rating 
agency Standard & Poor's has placed Hopewell Holdings' "BBB-" rating with negative 
implications because of the risk of the Bangkok project to the parent company in Hong 
Kong. 
ln Thailand, though many foreign investor participated infrastructure projects 
have been canceled or postponed, Thai Government still pushes the privatization of 
Thai Airways International, EGAT and other infrastructure projects such as: 
• Track Rehabilitation Project 
• Second Bangkok International Airport Development Project (SBlA) 
• The Third Stage Expressway Construction Project (Northern Route) 
25 "Government Rules Out Further Hopewell Talks." Bangkok Post (February 3，98) 
26 Amornrat Mahithirook. "Plan To Scrap Hopewell Contract Goes To Cabinet." Bangkok Post 
(December31, 97) 
27 "BERTS Project Drags On” Privatisation International (January 1，98) 
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• MRTA Initial System Project (Blue Line) 
• Wat Nakorn-In Bridge and Connecting Road Construction Project 
• Agriculture Credit for Rural Development Project 
• Distribution system Reliability Improvement Project 
• Rural Health Infrastructure^^ 




Benefits ofthe Private Participation Program 
The benefits of privatization vary from different countries. The electricity 
industry is regarded as a public service rather than as a commercial product. 
Privatization is an opportunity to raise the efficiency of state owned public utilities by 
stimulating competition, meeting the demand of consumers and generating economic 
growth. Therefore, there is an accelerating global trend towards privatization of major 
infrastructure projects across a broad range of countries. 
With the separation oftransmission and generation, establishing competition in 
electricity supply can improve efficiency which could be increased by the increasing 
productivity and creating diversification of energy supply. Stronger competition within 
the infrastructure markets should be established and a clear separation of the roles of 
regulator and operator should be set up. Regulators need to foster competition by 
loosening restrictions on the right to buy and sell power to facilitate the environment 
for competition, for example, customers are free to choose suppliers in Argentina after 
electricity privatization. 
Radical changes involve trade-offs between greater incentives to economic 
efficiency and higher commercial risks. After privatization, it is unclear whether the 
customers are benefited by privatization by the transition from an state-owned 
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monopoly to a private owned enterprise and it is difficult to measure economical and 
political benefits of a privatized public utility. 
Most developing countries have immature money and banking systems while 
local financial market and new market instruments would play an increasingly 
important role in financing huge infrastructure projects. In an immature financial 
market, implementation of infrastructure projects depend on capital inflows from 
abroad. Many Asian countries enjoy the prestige of having bonds issued in 
international currencies in their markets rather than in local currencies. Many countries 
has permitted the foreign banks to tap into local currency market and they prefer the 
ADB and Asian Finance and Investment Corporation to issue supposedly more 
prestigious 'dragon' bonds denominated in US dollars or yen in their markets. Asia 
lacks an efficient liquid local-currency bond markets to channel local savings into long-
term investments in the hugely expensive infrastructures. 
Domestic savings are likely to play a bigger role in financing private 
infrastructure projects. Although many countries want the payment in local currency, 
however, the disparity between the currencies of project funding and project revenues 
becomes a problem when the local currency devalues against the US dollar or other 
currencies. Lack of strong local capital markets cannot prevent the currency risk 
through local currency financing. Conversion of currency is also very important 
because restrictions on the convertibility of the local currency increases the difficulty. 
Also, inefficiencies in the use of capital for infrastructure projects is an important 
problem for many projects. 
In Thailand, the financial market need to be nurtured to maturity because the 
local financial market facilitates infrastructure financing, at the same time, financial 
market would be boosted by the financing of infrastructure projects. Developing new 
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financing approaches and insurance initiative that would alleviate private investors and 
commercial banks risk exposures, thereby attracting new capital to infrastructure 
projects. In short term, local capital markets are not big enough or well developed 
enough to play much of a role in large projects, therefore, there is an increasing 
opportunity for local capital markets to help medium size projects. As a result, more 
medium size projects can provide enough opportunities for the financial market to 
become more mature. 
Capital provided by local government, banks and private investors is 
insufficient to keep up with the growth in the demand for project financing. Although 
the projects are attractive to invest, the attractiveness is canceled out by lack of 
ftinding and recurrent threats of financial instability^^ Thus the Thai government can 
attract foreign investments in investing the private participated infrastructure projects 
by strong government support and providing higher returns. 
Importance ofProject Financing in Infrastructure Projects 
In privatization of state-owned infrastructure projects, project financing is very 
important because the characteristics of project finance are suitable for that. One ofthe 
characteristics of project finance is that a project specific entity would set up for the 
financing of the project, thus a portion of shares can be issued or sold to private 
investors for attracting equities^^. In the Khanom project, EGCO can remain control of 
KEGCO by holding the largest portion of shares in order to prevent the foreign control 
of important national resources like electricity in the early stage. Project finance can 
29 Christopher S. Bender, Alberto Diaz-Caycros and James E. Hass. "The Challenge ofEnvironmental 
Infrastructure Financing in Mexico." The Journal ofProject Finance (Pall 1996) 
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provide limited recourse and expand the debt capacity to the project sponsor by credit 
support from future cash flow. So the project can achieve higher leverage and it can 
management risks by comprehensive swaps and hedging. Thus project finance 
facilitates multiple ownership and risk sharing, ln electricity generating projects, 
economies of scale is important which can provide benefits to different parties and 
share different types of risks. 
Impact of Financial Crisis on the Project 
In the financial crisis, baht depreciated seriously and the stock market dropped 
substantially. Since the cash flow of KEGCO from selling electricity is in baht, 
however, most of debt repayments are in US dollar and Yen. Although KEGCO did 
hedge before the crisis, it still suffers foreign exchange loss and the demand for 
electricity dropped significantly^V Since, the financial crisis deeply affected the 
growing demand for electricity in Thailand, so it forced the whole industry to change. 
EGAT has an available supply of 5700 MW from IPP program and 3200 MW from 
SPP program, so further investment in electricity supply is not necessary. In addition, 
Thai Rating and Information Services (TRIS) announced that it had lowered EGAT's 
rating from "AA" to "A+" and KEGCO's BHD 7.5-billion senior secured debentures 
had been down-rated to "A-" from "A+" which was based on Thailand's increased 
economic risk, which is greater than previously anticipated^^. As a result, a weaker-
than-expected sovereign-supported profile will negatively affect EGAT's future debt-
servicing capacity. After the financial turmoil, Moody's announced that it was placing 
30 Peter K. Nevitt. Proiect Financing Fourth Edition. London: Euromoney Publications Limited, 1983. 
31 EGCO Reports Huge Forex Losses." Business Day Thailand (February 26, 98) 
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on review for downgrade Thailand's foreign currency ceilings for bonds and bank 
deposits33. Regarding short-term loans, there were still calls for repayments and the 
government and private sector would have to negotiate for repayment delays. 
After the depreciation ofbaht, KEGCO has faced higher debt cost, higher risks 
as well as lower credit ratings and share price. Therefore, it is difficult for KEGCO to 
fmance by both equities and debts. At that time, most of the infrastructure projects in 
Thailand and other Asian developing countries canceled or postponed. The economy 
was also slowed down. However, KEGCO could survive and the privatization 
processes continue. So, how does KEGCO survive after the financial crisis and what is 
the strength ofKEGCO compared with other infrastructure projects in Thailand? 
TariffStructure ofKEGCO 
Following the baht depreciation, fuel costs has risen and it leads to higher 
electricity tariffs because EGAT had changed the PPAs to allow EGCO, IPPs and 
SPPs to adjust tariffs in line with the baht's fluctuation against foreign currencies^\ 
EGAT agreed to allow EGCO to raise the capacity charge, one of the tariff-pricing 
factors, for the portion of expenditure involving foreign exchange which means the loss 
on foreign exchange transferred to electricity users�� . Thus, the tariff mechanism 
changed after the crisis, ln addition, EGAT would buy the electricity generated by 
KEGCO to secure KEGCO has enough cash flow which supports the repayments of 
debts. 
32 "EGAT, KEGCO See Their Ratings Lowered." Bangkok Post (February 25，98) 
33 Peter Janssen "Banks Underpin Economic Success." Asian Business (June 1996) 
34 Boonsong Kositchotethana. "Public Faces Higher Power Bills As Contract Changed." Bangkok Post 
(January31, 98) 
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Electricity tariff consists two parts. The demand charge reflects the rate of 
return to be earned by the utility on its assets and the energy charge refers to the 
variable costs incurred in the production and distribution. The demand charge formula 
ensures EGAT, PEA and MEA can maintain an 8% rate of return on re-valued assets. 
In addition, the Automatic Adjustment Mechanism allows charges in fuel prices and 
other expenses beyond EGAT control to be passed through as part of the energy 
charge. 
In the simplified tarifFequation, BCR = BAC * DCC * CAH + AFC + VOM or 
tariff 二 cost + ROE, it shows that the impact of the financial crisis on the debt 
repayment ofKEGCO transferred to electricity users by the financing arrangement and 
the PPA while KEGCO remains its return as before. One of the interview explained 
that EGAT is the offtaker in this arrangement but it has the authority to implement 
electricity price structure. Therefore, it is obvious that EGAT guarantees KEGCO has 
enough funding to repay loans and get the required return. In this arrangement, the 
only uncertainty is the EGAT which cannot ftilfill the obligation, however, EGAT has 
the full backing and credit ofthe Thai government and the credit rating of EGAT is as 
same as the rating of sovereignty. 
As a result, the impact of financial crisis on KEGCO is minimized by the 
financing arrangements and the support from EGAT and the government. Therefore, it 
can still survive after the financial crisis. 
35 "Electricity Generating Authority ofThailand - EGAT/EGCO PPAs Amended." Power in Asia 
(September 2, 98) 
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Government Reaction After the Financial Crisis 
Efficiency of private infrastructure provision depends on the policy and 
regulatory environment, ln the infrastructure development process, it takes a long time 
to bring to a close because there are many bureaucratic, technical and financial 
difficulties. One of the interviewed banker stated that private development of 
infrastructures cannot stop the involvement and character from the government, 
though the government had lost controlling the industry directly and powers. 
Many governments do not want foreign investment controls the economy of 
the host country. Therefore, restrictions and regulations are required to protect the 
interests of the country, consumers and private sector participants. Appropriate 
regulatory framework to protect the best interests of the public and to avoid unfair 
competition is necessary. Political stability, clarity of policy and a reliable legal 
framework are often of far greater concern in many Asian countries. Therefore, 
detailed contractual arrangements to protect private power producers are important. 
ln comparing the cases of KEGCO and BERTS, it is not difficult to fmd out 
that infrastructure development fully supported by the host government is an absolute 
advantage. The sponsor of BERTS, Hopewell, is a foreign private investor and the 
BERTS project is not fully supported by the local government, however, it is a 
necessary infrastructure for the people living and working there. 
The major problem ofBERTS is that Hopewell does not have enough funding 
to develop such huge projects, in addition, there are always conflicts with the Thai 
authorities. In the financing arrangement, there is no guarantee of minimum revenue or 
pass-through risks from the government. Thus, the credit rating would be lower and 
the cost of fiinding would be higher. During the financial crisis, BERTS had suffered 
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huge loss from depreciation ofbaht but the foreign exchange loss cannot be transferred 
to end-users. Moreover, the PPA in KEGCO cannot be re-negotiated and the tariff can 
be changed after the crisis. However, in BERTS, the contract could not be re-
negotiated. Since the Hopewell has a large amount of debt burden with low credit 
rating, it is difficult for them to fund and develop BERTS after the crisis that was 
requested by the Thai government. 
Market Responses 
It is obvious that the cumulative abnormal return of EGCO less Bangkok SET 
Index is positive in the past three years except the period between May 15, 97 to June 
30，97. The price movement was positive and was increasing continuously to nearly 
70% after June 97. At this time, this was the depreciation period of Thai baht 
(Appendix 6). In addition, the stock market in Bangkok have decreased since the 
beginning of 1996. However, the cumulative abnormal return is positive in this period. 
Therefore, it shows that though the stock market dropped before and after the financial 
crisis, and the influence ofbaht depreciation, the cumulative abnormal return of EGCO 
shows that there is no negative influence from the impact of financial crisis in the price 
movement. 
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Future Developments 
The speedy development of domestic capital markets and related instruments 
with long-term maturities which are able to attract foreign investment^G i^ developing 
countries, local capital is limited and it is impossible to finance infrastructure projects^^ 
The interviewers agreed that there is many development space for more international 
bond investors. Project financing involves a combination of equity, syndicated 
commercial debt, multi-lateral debt, senior project debt, subordinated or long term 
debt, co-financing, export credit support and issue of bonds or other securities but 
most offunding are come from abroad. Since the simple mixture of sponsor equity and 
limited recourse debt is not appropriate in most cases, so financial structures becomes 
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more complex, and more specifically tailored to the risk profile of individual projects 
36 Takatoshi Ito and Anne 0 . Kmeger. Financial Deregulation and Integration in East Asia. Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press. 
37 M.G. Quibria and J Malcolm Dowling. Current Issues in Economic Development. An Asian 
Perspective. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996. 
38 Nora L. Scheiiikestel. Rethinking Project Finance: allocating and Mitigating Risk in Australasian 
Projects. Hong Kong: Asia Law & Practice Publishing Limited. 1997. 
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The interviewers believed that the risks in infrastructure projects was 
underestimated before financial crisis. After the crisis, higher risks results higher cost 
offunding. Moreover, Thai SOEs have become critical players in the issuance ofbonds 
because of their need for funds for infrastructure projects and because of the ceiling 
imposed in off-shore loans. Thai company bonds have been largely in foreign 
currencies in foreign markets in the past. Therefore, the trend would be more baht 
issues because the cost of funds raised through offshore bonds is nearly the same as 
those raised locally. Although the bonds issued offshore could get coupon rates that 
were lower than domestic issues, high swap premiums and foreign exchange 
fluctuations will make the offshore issues less attractive. 
ln the future, project sponsors are increasingly willing to take both 
implementation and market risk. Local investors will play a larger role in local 
investments and more projects will seek support from different levels of government 
and authorities. In the developing economies, large infrastructure projects have 
different risks including technical, economic, business and political risks. In order to 
enhance credit rating for getting cheaper loans, credit enhancement and risk sharing 
packages will become popular in attractive projects. Limited amounts of fully 
subordinated debt with defined restrictions on payment will often enhance the project's 
credit. Privatization involves the transfer of some of the risks to the private sector and 
risks should be allocated to the party best able to manage it. Investment insurance has 
proven to be an important mechanism for facilitating limited recourse projects because 
it mitigate investors' fears and clarify the division of who is bearing what risks. 
Previous experiences showed that risks are always underestimated because 
risks are borne by the governments and customers before privatization. In Asia, the 
power industry are national monopolies with strong political influence. The process of 
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negotiating contracts between government and developer is a political minefield, ln 
addition, strong relationship with government could improve the credit rating, 
however, it remains inefficiency and non-competitive structure of the industry. 
Privatization policies and initiatives have out paced regulatory reform needed to allay 
investors' risk concerns. Many of these changes will occur slowly, especially in 
countries that have only just started to liberalize and privatize. Some of the Asian 
languages, legal systems and culture is difficult to cope with fast changing environment 
of innovative financial products. So, complex documentation is required in project 
finance because the legal and regulation framework cannot support the development of 
project finance comprehensively. In addition, corruption is inevitable in projects since 
the relationship with government authorities is critical in project developments while 
corruption is common in Asian developing countries. 
Financially overburdened governments foster stable, adequately regulated 
macroeconomic environments which can gain confidence of foreign investors but they 
are increasingly unable to protect the environment. Most countries have no clear 
standards for the control of pollution. In Thailand, in EGAT's 1994 solicitation, 
environmental standards were tightened shortly before the submission of the bids. 
Power producers prepare to use clean fuels and new generating technologies which 
reduce harmfiil emissions and cut fuel consumption. 
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Privatization Experience of the United Kingdom 
The UK experience would be relevant for countries which the electricity system 
is centralized and expand not rapidly^^. The public requires reform of the power 
industry because they want the electricity industry to become more efficient by 
privatization. A number of unresolved issues occurs after six years. The transition from 
a stable public-sector framework based on monopoly to a more fluid private and 
liberalized structure could create some problems^. It is still unclear whether the power 
industry is in transition to a new but different form of stability, or whether there will be 
a process of continuous change in response to external factors or internal tensions 
within the industry. In the UK experience, the more comprehensive the initial 
settlement, the greater the difficulty to remedy the situation. After privatization, 
government involvement in the industry is still large. In addition, the initial 
privatization structure can change rapidly by mergers and acquisitions, ln the 
competitions, the government should ensure the benefits of end-users and the society. 
39 Mike Parker. The British Electricity Experiment: Privatization: The Record, the Issues, the 
Lessons. London: Earthscan, 1996. 
4G Jane Roberts, David Elliot and Trevor Houghton. Privatising electricity： The Politics of Power. 
London and New York: Belhaven Press. 1991. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The initial objective of opening the power sector is to provide cheap and 
sufficient electricity by improving efficiency of power plants. In order to get higher 
efficiency, the policy is that EGAT has started the privatization of Rayong and 
Khanom. Thus the IPPs and SPPs would join the industry in order to create 
competition for higher efficiency. EGAT set up EGCO to acquire state-owned plants 
by establishing specific companies like REGCO and KEGCO. In the financing, a large 
amount of foreign currency loan involved which is cheaper and more available to fund 
than that oflocal capital. 
During the early stages in the privatization processes, a sudden Asian financial 
crisis occurred which burst the economic bubble built up in the early 1990s. One of the 
major problems of the crisis is the baht depreciation. Therefore, KEGCO faced a large 
loss in foreign exchange because its revenue is in baht but the debt repayment is in 
foreign currency, though it did hedge comprehensively. In order to pay more for the 
debt by depreciation, KEGCO has to increase tariff and shift the risk and loss to 
electricity subscribers. In the meanwhile, KEGCO still enjoys high ROE by 
renegotiation of new PPA with EGAT which is both the offtaker and the price setter. 
Therefore, the electricity become more expensive due to foreign exchange loss 
and dropping electricity demand in the early stages of the privatization processes. 
Efficiency would not be improved unless the ownership is actually changed to private, 
47 
SO more competition is welcomed and changes in all levels of staff are important 
because reward system and incentives of taking risk are different between a public 
utility and a private one. 
The credit rating could be improved by different levels of governments and 
authorities, it is no sufficient protection for private foreign infrastructure investors 
investing in Asian developing countries. In the experience of KEGCO, proper 
allocation of risks which includes sovereign guarantees ensures the survival of the 
project after the serious impact of financial crisis on the whole economy, ln Asia, the 
demand of infrastructure development is still there after the crisis. It is an opportunity 
for developers and financiers to play more aggressive role in getting higher return with 
higher risks than before. 
At last, electricity prices would affect the political risk of the government 
because the government would not intervene the electricity prices but EGAT has the 
authority to intervene the price structure. The relationship between government and 
regulator will always be ambiguous and high tariffs may not be affordable which can 
cause political problems. 
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APPENDIX 1 
COUNTRY OVERVIEW OF THAILAND 
Thailand locates in southeast Asia and it is a developing country with a GDP 
currently ranked 26th and the energy consumption is growing. Thailand is ranked 39 
out of 46 countries from the IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook 1998, though it 
was ranked 29 in the previous year. Thailand's evolution from a rice farming economy 
to a modern economy has required continual re-assessment of its infrastructure 
planning. The World Bank predicted Thailand would have to spend a higher 
percentage of its GDP on infrastructure than southeast Asia countries, ln addition, the 
Bank has mentioned that such huge investments in infrastructure have to privatize as 
well as government investment. 
Population: 60.3 million 
Ethnic Groups: Thai (75%), Chinese (14%), others (11%) 
Currency: Baht 
Exports: Textiles, food, integrated circuits and rubber 
Imports: Food, household appliances, chemicals, machinery and fuel. 
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APPENDIX 1 
SUPPORT OF mFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS FROM THE WORLD BANK 
Infrastructure Privatization's, 1989-1994 
-Vo lume (US$bn) No. of companies No. of countries 
1989 2.8 n 4  
1990 6.0 32 10  
1991 6.8 41 H  
1992 9.8 — 63 n  
1993 T ? " 一 90 [8 
"l994 10.1 75 30 — 
Source: World Bank 
Infrastructure Projects in Developing Countries, 1990-1995 
Region/Sector No. US$ bn 
Total 361 150.1 
By region  
Africa 15 1.7 
Asia 137 6 ^  
CAMENA - 13 — 11.4 
Europe ^ 7 ^  
Latin America VT^  61.5 
By sector  
Gas 23 - 10.0 ~ 
Power 1 ^ 5 M  
Telecom ^ 4 M  
Transport ~~ 114 ^  
Waste/water 18 10.2 




PROFIT BREAKDOWN (Btm)  
^ e a r to31 Dec 95 96 97 98F 
^ l e s 3859 5987 7677 "7670 — 
Service Income n.a. i ^ ^ 45  
^ o s t ofSales -1318 ^ 5 0 “ -2942 • -3033 
Cost of Service n.a. n ^ ^48 -52 
Gross Profit 2540 ~ m i “ 4718 4630 
Other Income 403 946 779 “ 752 
Selling ^ -392 ^ ^ 1 ^ 
Administration  
^ I T - 2552 4085 l o T ? 4675 — 
Interest -1460 -2315 -3182 -2700 
Expenses  
Forex Loss r ^ ^ -7303 -1577 
1Pre-tax Profit 一 1092 TT70 _ -5468 399 
Corporate -152 -219 n.a. n.a. 
Income Tax  
l ^ e t Profit |94O | l 5 5 1 -5464 403 
Source; "EGCO Report." RMG Barings (February 26，98) 
• E R I M R E S U L T S ( B t m )  
"Quarter to 31 Dec 1997 1996 % Change 
Sales ~2062 1873 一 10.08 
Cost of Sales -1033 -861 19.98 
Gross Profit 1029 — 1012 "l.66 
^ & A , Interest -914 一 -985 -87.85 
Other Income 32 267 -87.85 
Other Expenses -23 n.a. n.a. 
EBIT 124 T 9 4 -57.71 
Forex Loss -7189 n.a. n.a. 
Corporate Income 106 72 47.2 
Taz  
l ^ e t Profit -6959 366 —n.a. 
Source: "EGCO Report." m G Barings (February 26，98) 
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APPENDIX 1 
PROJECTS UNDER PLANMNG DSf EGAT 
Power Plant Total (MW) Commissioning Date  
Wang Noi CC Stage 2 (GT)— 400 Nov 97 - Dec 98  
Purchased Power ^ Jan 98  
Yatchaburi CC1 (GT) 400 “ Jul 98 - Aug 98 
Ratchaburi CC2 (GT) 400 Sep 98 - Aug 98  
Wang Noi CC Stage 2 (ST) 200 Nov 98  
Ratchaburi CC3 (GT) 400 Nov 98 - Dec 98 
Purchased Power ^ Jan 99  
Ratchaburi Thermal 700 Apr 99 
Ratchaburi CC2 (ST) — 200 _ Jul 99  
Ratchaburi Thermal 700 Aug 99 
Ratchaburi CC2 (ST) — 200 Sep 99  
Purchased Power ^ Oct99  
Ratchaburi CC3 (ST) _ 200 一 Nov 99 
Purchased Power 400 Jan 2000 
Krabi/Surat Thani Thermal 300 l a n 2000 
Ratchaburi Thermal 700 Oct 2000 
Ratchaburi Thermal 700 Feb 2001 
Purchased Power 1400 Apr 2001 
Southern Region Thermal 300 Mar 2002 
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EXCHANGE RATE OF THAI BAHT AND BANGKOK SET INDEX 
Exchange Rate of Thai Baht Against US dollar in the Previous 10 Years 
Exchange Rate of Baht Against US dollar 
60 j 
. : : / 
C 0) / 
P - -： I 
^ 20-
1 0 -
0 J  00 00 0) 0) 0 T- T- CsJ CN CO 寸 寸 LO U") CO CD h- 00 
go 00 00 CO gj 2j 5j 5j gj gj 5> 5j 5 gj gj 5j gj gj CD CD CD CO CD CD CD CD CD CD CD CD CD CD CD CD CD (D £N SN £N £^  £N £N £N QJ £N £N CJ ¢1 £i| £N £N JN £N CN CO 0 LO o3 r^  CN 0) 寸 ^ CO -^ 00 co 0 u^  c3 r^  o3 
产 T— X— T— T— 
Date 


















































































































































































































































































































ADB Asian Development Bank 
AP Availability Payment 
BAC Base Availability Credit 
BERTS Bangkok Elevated Road and Train System 
CPI Consumer Price Index 
DRA Deduction for Reduced Availability 
DCC Dependable Contracted Capacity 
EGAT Electricity Generating Authority Thailand 
EGCO Electricity Generating Company 
FAP Full Availability Payment 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
GW Gigawatt 
IFC International Finance Corporation 
IMF International Monetary Fund 
IPO Initial Public Offering 
IPP Independent Power Producer 
IRR Internal Rate ofReturn 
KEGCO Khanom Electricity Generating Company Limited 
LIBOR London Interbank Offered Rate 
MEA Metropolitan Electricity Authority 
MOF Ministry ofFinance 
MW Megawatt 
NAV Net Asset Value 
NEPC National Energy Policy Council 
NEPO National Energy Policy Office 
NPV Net Present Value 
PEA Provincial Electricity Authority 
PTT Petroleum Authority ofThailand 
REGCO Rayong Electricity Generating Company Limited 
SEC Securities and Exchange Commission 
SET Stock Exchange of Thailand 
SPP Small Power Producer 
TRIS Thai Rating and Information Services 
VAT Value Added Tax 
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